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SURGICAL ETHICS CHALLENGES
Institutional futility: Factual or phony?
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, TexThat he is mad, ’tis true: ’tis true ’tis pity; and pity ’tis ’tis
true.
Epistrophe from Hamlet, Act II
Dr R Kaic has performed procedure Y at Middling
General Hospital for well over three decades. He has
acceptable not exceptional clinical outcomes. However,
his very fastidious patient care habits have remained
unchanged from the pre-Diagnosis Related Groups era,
and his statewide reputation for accepting riskier cases
generates a constant flow of more gravely ill patients.
His busy practice is losing the hospital enough money
to cause concern that several other community services
for the medically indigent will have to be severely cut
back or discontinued. The chief-of-staff and others
have tried to help Dr R Kaic with clinical pathways and
suggestions about patient selection, but he remains
adamant about his practice style. The board of directors
has denied Dr Kaic’s recertification. What should the
president of the medical staff do?
A. Call a general meeting to protest this infringement.
B. Contact the home office of the American Medical As-
sociation for support.
C. Both A and B.
D. Ask an independent consultant to verify the condemn-
ing data.
E. Acknowledge that the hospital has a right for preserva-
tion that supersedes Dr R Kaic’s right to practice.
Economic theory accurately predicts the societal inter-
actions of production, distribution, and consumption of
goods and services. It makes several assumptions: goods
and services are freely available but finite, multiple con-
sumer options exist, and consumers are rational. In the
business world, it is clearly recognized that medicine is the
most complex microeconomic system in existence. The
medical consumer has little knowledge and limited choice
of what is being consumed, only knowing that what is being
consumed is important and perhaps essential to their
health. The physician-driver of the process decides how
much is consumed and gets paid according to the amount
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economics as supplier-induced demand. The hospital where
consumption mainly takes place provides the goods being
consumed but does not determine the amount of con-
sumption or the price paid for what is consumed.
If asked their goals, the resounding answer of each of
these principals would be: to improve the patient’s health.
However, secondary goals of each participant differ and
may modify behaviors used to achieve the same goal. The
consumer’s consideration of cost, important in all other
areas of business, has minimal effect on major health care
services such as those requiring hospitalization.1 The
change in demand resulting from a change in price is
measured by an equation termed the cross-price elasticity:
demand for services decreases as price rises. The preferences
of a patient-consumer of health care are dependent on their
health status much more than the cost. The lower one’s
health status, the less cost influences the consumption of
health care.2 Simply said, sicker people are willing, some-
times eager, to consume expensive medical care. Medical
care, like basic foodstuffs, is considered inelastic: the price
has relatively little effect on consumption.
Another confounding economic variable is the decrease
in the percent of out-of-pocket expenses from 48.7% in
1960 (a real deterrent) to plateauing at 16% in the late
1990s, effectively shielding many insured patients from the
full burden of economic consequences from the choices
they and their physicians have made.1 Also influencing
consumption but outside the equation are the associated
complications of major surgery that can cause initial costs to
spin out of control with no one at fault.3
Patients are clueless in knowing whether their care was
superior, adequate, unnecessary, or contraindicated. A neigh-
bor who cut his hand a while ago effusively complimented the
treating physicians because he “did not have to sit for hours in
an emergency room.” He went directly to a small clinic and
saw a nonsurgeon who cleaned and bandaged his hand, and
scheduled him an appointment with the clinic’s surgeon for
the following day. The patient was seen and scheduled to go
to the hospital 2 days hence when it was the surgeon’s normal
operating day. So, after 3 days and three appointments, his
laceration was sutured, “delayed closure” for sure. The patient,
an intelligent layperson, was affixed entirely on the prompt
and friendly way he was received. What surgeon has not
noticed that patients consider that the attractiveness of their
incisions as the main indicator of the quality of their surgery?
Acting as the agent advocate of the patient, physicians
greatly influence consumption of resources with but little
personal risk of over-utilization; utilization per se is re-
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or even whether indicated.4 This is partly from the simplis-
tic idea that professional advocacy requires that cost should
never enter into the practice of medicine. Professionalism
of cost actually means that if cost enters into the treatment
decision, it be given secondary status and never be the sole
determinant.5 By placing cost in a subordinate position
does not mean it can be forgotten.6
The hospital administrator influences the per-item cost
of supplies and salaries of hospital personnel, but with the
government regulations, Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Healthcare Organizations requirements, and staff-
ing demands, administrators administrate organizations
whose economics are mainly outside of their control. The
hospital administrator’s situation is the equivalent of man-
aging a smorgasbord where the wholesale cost of the food
relentlessly increases, the price you can charge is deter-
mined by Congress and insurance executives, and custom-
ers could take as much food as they want, depending on
how hungry they were, for a set price. And if customers
showed up famished at your stand with no money, by law,
you were required to furnish all the food they needed
without hope of being paid. The unpaid medical costs of
the uninsured during 2005 totaled $43,118,528,000.7
The surgeon must have a legitimate interest in the
financial health of the hospital with which he or she affiliates
because the hospital’s well-being affects the community’s
medical care. A conflict between institutional policies and
patient care requirements signals that the organization’s or
the physician’s practices require realignment with the goals
of the medical profession. This case raises the issue of a
surgeon who imperils the hospital’s legitimate financial
interests and thus its mission, including the provision of
services to the medically indigent.
No organization, however beneficently disposed, is
obligated to drive itself out of business by persistently
incurring more cost than it can replace. In the particular
case of a hospital, neglecting its balance sheet to the extent
that it cannot provide services for the sick and injured of its
community would constitute gross irresponsibility, as a
breach of a critical social contract. Physicians and hospital
administrators thus share a cofiduciary responsibility for the
welfare of patients who require the institution’s care,8 and
that duty includes making sure that the hospital is opera-
tional when patients need it. When variations in practice
styles become inconsistent with a physician’s cofiduciary
obligations to a hospital, the physician’s autonomy to con-
tinue such practices is justifiably challenged by the hospi-
tal’s administrative and medical leadership.
Most surgeons believe that their responsibility to practice
economically is secondary to their responsibility to practice
effectively. Surgeons should take no satisfaction from mini-
mizing hospital costs if they have done so by minimizing the
quality of patient care. Hospital leadership that expects sur-
geons to do so does not understand the hospital’s cofiduciary
responsibility to patients. And yet, it is inconsistent with a role
as an ethical surgeon, who takes cofiduciary responsibility
seriously, to knowingly consume excess resources sufficient toburden clinical care for the hospital’s other patients. Having
an unrestrained approach to practice is to foolishly ignore the
Law of Diminishing Returns that emphasizes the limits of
resources. As increments of cost are added, a point will be
reached where there will be no added benefit, although cost
continues to rise. When giving the appropriate antibiotic,
once the optimal therapeutic level is reached, continuing to
inject more will not be beneficial; medical over-treatment is
likely to be harmful.
Massive over-treatment might also unnecessarily harm
the hospital’s legitimate financial interests (depending on
the source of payment for the patients in question), result-
ing in “institutional futility” by incurring monetary losses
sufficient to imperil the mission of the hospital that do not
improve the quality of patient’s care.
To define institutional futility: a medical institution
must be providing valuable healthcare services to the com-
munity. The institution provides a particular service that is
losing enough money to require discontinuance of more
important programs than the money-losing service. Finally,
the money-losing service is available elsewhere. Thus, Dr R
Kiac’s practice at the Middling Hospital fulfills the criteria
for institutional futility and cannot continue unchanged.
Options A, B, and C should be reserved for unjustified
institutional intrusions on physician autonomy. In this instance,
justice demands that communitymedical needs take precedence
over a physician’s inefficiencies and slanted patient mix.
Re-examination of data, as suggested by D, is only
needed if the executives of Middling Hospital are consid-
ered to be dishonest or incompetent. Besides, the data to be
reexamined would remain that furnished by the hospital.
Our choice is E. A hospital facing legitimate correctable
institutional futility is not ethically obligated to accept a phy-
sician’s behavior that is causal and continues after appropriate
efforts to change that behavior have been ignored. In such
cases, the drastic measure of ending privileges is ethically
justified, and the chief of the medical staff is, as a matter of
cofiduciary responsibility, ethically obligated to accept this
action. Failing to correct correctable institutional futility when
discovered ’tis madness, ’tis true, and ’tis pity, ’tis true.
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